ClientEarth (No 2): A Case of Three Legal Dimensions by Bell, Joanna
 1 





ClientEarth (No. 2) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs1 is the 
latest stage in the legal saga concerning the UK Government’s continuing breach of the 
2008/50/EC Air Quality Directive.2 The case is centred on the lawfulness of the Government’s 
latest Air Quality Plan, a document published in December 2015, which lays out the current 
plans for ensuring that levels of nitrogen dioxide across the UK are reduced to lawful levels. 
The non-governmental organisation, ClientEarth sought to argue that a number of flaws in the 
approach to ‘air quality modelling’3 used by the Government in the production of this Air 
Quality Plan rendered it unlawful. Garnham J, the judge in the High Court who heard the case, 
accepted ClientEarth’s arguments, ultimately issuing an order requiring that the Government 
produce a new Air Quality Plan by April 2017.4 
This analysis has two main purposes. The first is to show that ClientEarth (No. 2) is a 
case of three legal dimensions. What this means is that three distinct sets of legal concerns play 
an important role in both the applicant’s arguments and Garnham J’s reasoning. These related 
first, to environmental modelling, second, to European Union (EU) law and, third, to domestic 
judicial review. The first purpose of this analysis is to draw attention to these three legal 
dimensions and to discuss the role played by each in how the court reached its conclusion.  
Following from this, the second objective is to reflect on these dimensions, focusing in 
particular on environmental modelling and domestic judicial review. In relation environmental 
modelling, it is useful to consider the role that judges play in scrutinising such processes. As 
will be shown, there has been a tendency on the part of judges to speak of environmental 
modelling as a field of public decision-making in relation to which it is appropriate to take a 
highly deferential approach to scrutiny. This analysis, explains why, in my view, although 
ClientEarth (No. 2) does not mark a sea-change in the approach towards a rigorous approach 
to scrutiny across the board, it does suggest that the courts will intensify scrutiny when the 
legislative context demands it.  
In relation to domestic judicial review, it is helpful to consider the role the grounds of 
error of law and irrelevant considerations played in the legal reasoning in ClientEarth (No. 2). 
My argument is that the usefulness of these grounds lay in the provision of a legal framework 
around which the applicant’s argument and the court’s conclusions could be organised. This is 
interesting from two perspectives. From an administrative law perspective, it is a reminder that 
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the concept of a ‘ground’ of judicial review is not monistic; different grounds play different 
roles in legal reasoning and interact differently with legislation. From an environmental law 
perspective, it is an illustration of the utility of the domestic grounds of judicial review in 
providing a recognisable legal structure over which difficult, and novel, legal arguments can 
be draped. There are, accordingly, a considerable number of reasons why ClientEarth (No 2) 
is an important case worthy of analysis.  
 
BACKGROUND 
Before turning to ClientEarth (No 2) itself it is useful to first provide two important aspects of 
the background to the case. First, it is helpful to briefly outline the background legal framework 
and, in particular, the Air Quality Directive.5 The EU has long held a commitment to improving 
the quality of ambient air within Member States with the goal, in turn, of lessening the impact 
of climate change, ozone depletion and acidification.6 In light of this commitment, in 2005 the 
Commission announced a major new Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution,7 the aims of which 
include the prevention of ‘thousands of premature deaths from pollution-related illnesses’8 and 
the drastic reduction of ‘damages to crops, forests and other ecosystems.’9 Part of the strategy 
included an overhaul of existing legislation for the purposes of improvement and 
simplification. The product of this part of the strategy was the Air Quality Directive. Much 
could be said of this Directive,10 however, for the purposes of understanding ClientEarth (No. 
2) it is only necessary to discuss two of its key provisions.  
First, Article 13 of the Directive affirms11 an obligation on the part of Member States to 
reduce the quantity of nitrogen dioxide present in ambient air below a specified level.12 The 
date stipulated for fulfilment of this obligation was 1 January 2010.13 Second, in the event of a 
Member State failing to fulfil this obligation by the stipulated deadline, Article 23 of the 
Directive places Member States under a further obligation to produce an ‘Air Quality Plan.’14 
Importantly, Article 23 requires that the content of such a plan must ‘set out appropriate 
measures, so that the exceedance period can be kept as short as possible.’15 
The second important piece of background information is the Supreme Court’s decision 
in R (ClientEarth) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food & Rural Affairs [2015] 
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UKSC 28.16 In this case, the Supreme Court recognised that the Government, in failing to 
reduce nitrogen dioxide below the specified level for a number of ‘zones’ and 
‘agglomerations’17 within the UK, was in continuous breach of its core obligation under Article 
13 of the Air Quality Directive.18 Accordingly the Supreme Court concluded the Government 
was obligated to produce an Air Quality Plan in accordance with the terms of Article 23.19 A 
mandatory order was thus issued ‘requiring the Secretary of State to prepare new air quality 
plans under Article 23.’20 The date specified for the production of these plans was 31 December 
2015. The Government published its new Air Quality Plan on 17 December 2015.21 It was the 
lawfulness of this plan, which was the central issue in ClientEarth (No. 2).22 
 
A CASE OF THREE LEGAL DIMENSIONS 
As noted above, the first point that this analysis sets out to make is that the applicant’s 
arguments and judge’s reasoning in ClientEarth (No. 2) have three distinct, though closely 
related, legal dimensions. Though it somewhat defies the chronology of the judgment, it is 
helpful to begin with the environmental modelling dimension. At this level the applicant sought 
to argue that the approach to ‘air quality modelling’23 taken by the Government in the 
development of its Air Quality Plan was fundamentally flawed in two central ways.  
First, the Government, in developing its new Air Quality Plan, had made no adjustments 
to its usual modelling method. This method, which the Government had adopted ‘as a matter 
of routine for a number of years’24 partly on the basis that it was generally used by the European 
Commission,25 generated projections on a five-yearly cycle. As a result, and given that the 
latest projection had related to 2015, the Government had fixed on 2020 as the year by which 
it would aim to achieve the reductions in nitrogen dioxide. This, ClientEarth argued, was 
illegitimate. ClientEarth emphasised the urgency with which steps needed to be taken meant 
that the Government ought to have adjusted its usual modelling approach in order to generate 
projections at more regular intervals. Furthermore, there was some suggestion in the case that 
this could have been done for a ‘relatively modest cost’26 but that the government had opted 
not to switch models for reasons of administrative convenience.27 The second flaw in the 
government’s modelling methods to which ClientEarth pointed was the use of overly optimistic 
estimates. The Government, in particular, had made use of a particular set of estimates, known 
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as the ‘COPERT’ estimates,28 of the quantity of nitrogen dioxide emitted by diesel vehicles 
when it was commonly thought that such vehicles emitted a considerably greater quantity than 
the estimates suggested.29 Garnham J agreed that both of these flaws rendered the 
Government’s Air Quality Plan unlawful.30 
The second, EU law dimension of the applicant’s argument consisted in the allegation 
that the government, in developing its Air Quality Plan, had acted contrary to Article 23 of the 
Air Quality Directive.31 In particular, ClientEarth argued that the various flaws in the 
Government’s approach to modelling meant that it had failed to comply with the requirement 
in Article 23 that set out measures that will ensure ‘that the exceedance period can be kept as 
short as possible’32 Thus, by failing to move to a modelling approach which would generate 
projections on a more regular basis the government had arbitrarily settled on 2020 when it 
could very well have identified measures capable of achieving the reduction more quickly. 
Similarly, the Government’s use of the misleading COPERT estimates created an undue risk 
that its calculations as to the effectiveness of measures were inaccurate.  
Closely related to this EU law dimension of ClientEarth’s argument was a third, domestic 
judicial review dimension. At this level, the applicant’s case amounted to the assertion that the 
Government had failed to comply, in developing its Air Quality Plan, with certain domestic 
grounds of judicial review. Two such grounds played a particularly important role in the course 
of ClientEarth’s argument. The first ground is the error of law. Thus at points, ClientEarth’s 
complaint is expressed as being that the Government, in continuing to make use of a modelling 
approach based on a five-yearly cycle, had ‘erred in law in [its] approach to the requirement 
of Article 23 that periods of exceedance should be kept as short as possible.’33 The second 
ground raised is the consideration of an irrelevant factor. As such, at other points in the case 
the applicant’s argument is presented as being that, in failing to adjust its modelling approach, 
the Government had unduly taken account of ‘considerations of cost, political sensitivity and 
administrative difficulties’,34 which were ‘of secondary importance to the Directive’s primary 
purpose of protecting human health.’35 
In approaching these EU law and domestic judicial review dimensions of the applicant’s 
case, Garnham J gave close consideration to the meaning of Article 23. He emphasised, in 
particular, three propositions, which he took to be explicit or implicit in the terms of this 
Article. First, that Article 23 confers on Member States an element of ‘discretion’36 in the 
selection of measures included in an Air Quality Plan but that this discretion is ‘narrow and 
greatly constrained.’37 In particular, Garnham J stressed that Member States’ choices are 
limited by the overarching requirement of ensuring ‘that the plans are devised in such a way as 
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31 See for example ibid [5].  
32 Air Quality Directive (n 2), Article 13 (my emphasis). See also Regulation 26 of the Air Quality Standards 
Regulations (2010/1001) pls provide full ref which implements this requirement into domestic law.  
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to meet the limit value in the shortest possible time.’38 Second, that while there may be 
circumstances in which a Member State may legitimately take into account considerations of 
cost in the formulation of an Air Quality Plan (such as where a Member State is choosing 
between two measures which will be equally effective in reducing nitrogen dioxide levels39), 
it is illegitimate for a Member State to take into account economic considerations in fixing a 
target date for the reduction of nitrogen dioxide.40 On the basis of these propositions, Garnham 
J considered that the Government’s failure to make use of an approach to modelling which 
generated projections on a more regular basis, partly as a response to considerations of cost,41 
rendered its Air Quality Plan unlawful.  
A third and final proposition that Garnham J took to be implicit in Article 23 is a little 
more difficult. For Garnham J, embedded in this Article is a requirement of proportionality. 
This requirement he explained in the following terms: ‘the measures a Member State may 
adopt… must be proportionate in the sense of being no more than is required to meet the 
target.’42 There are two senses in which this statement can be understood, each corresponding 
to a different limb of the proportionality mechanism.43 First, Garnham J can be understood as 
invoking the ‘least intrusive measure’44 limb of proportionality. On this understanding, 
Garnham J’s suggestion is that a measure, which makes a reduction to nitrogen dioxide levels 
will be deemed disproportionate if there is an equally effective, but less invasive, measure 
available. Second, Garnham J can be understood as invoking the final, ‘balancing’45 limb of 
proportionality. On this reading, it is Garnham J’s suggestion that any measure which 
‘impact[s] adversely on... proper and reasonable interests’46 and which does ‘more than is 
required’47 in terms of reducing levels of nitrogen dioxide below the level specified in the Air 
Quality Directive will be deemed to have struck an improper balance. This second reading of 
Article 23 is deeply problematic. If correct, it would have the unfortunate effect of precluding 
Member States from implementing measures, which go beyond the protections laid down by 
EU law. Given that there is nothing in the Directive to suggest that its intention it to tie the 
hands of Member States in this way, this aspect of Garnham J’s judgment ought to be 
understood in the first sense.  
To summarise, an important feature of ClientEarth (No. 2) is that the court’s decision, 
and the applicant’s argument, had three distinct legal dimensions. That is, the conclusion of the 
case can be expressed in terms of three different sets of legal concerns. From the perspective 
of environmental modelling concerns, the court’s conclusion was that that the Government’s 
approach to air quality modelling was tainted by a number of fundamental flaws. From a the 
perspective of EU law concerns, the court’s decision can be understood as being that the 
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43 For helpful discussion of the proportionality method see especially Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] 
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Government, in developing its Air Quality Plan, had failed to comply with the Article 23 
requirement that such plans include measures designed to ensure that the ‘exceedance period… 
be kept as short as possible.’48 Finally, from the perspective of domestic judicial review 
concerns the court’s conclusion was that the Government made an error of law in relation to 
the meaning of Article 23 and had taken account of irrelevant considerations of cost in setting 
its target date for realising reductions in nitrogen dioxide.  
In the final parts of this study, this analysis will be further developed. It will focus in 
particular, on the environmental modelling and domestic judicial review dimensions in relation 
to which, in my view, the case is of considerable interest. Before turning to these reflections, 
however, a more general point can be made about the significance of ClientEarth (No. 2): the 
case is a clear illustration of the multi-dimensional nature of EU environmental law. It is a 
reminder that a judge, in hearing a case within this field, must navigate many overlapping layers 
of argument and, in reaching a conclusion, must seek to weave together strands taken from 
various sources.  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL MODELLING DIMENSION: HOW RIGOROUSLY WILL 
JUDGES SCRUTINISE ENVIRONMENTAL MODELS? 
In relation to the environmental modelling dimension, the question which ClientEarth (no. 2) 
raises is the following: what role will the judiciary play in scrutinising the environmental 
modelling processes deployed by executive bodies? In exploring this question, and the 
contribution made by the case, it is helpful to begin with the following passage from Collins 
J’s judgment in the High Court in Downs49 – a case which was in part concerned with a 
challenge to a bystander pesticide-exposure model:  
 There are conflicting views as to the adequacy of the [modelling] approach 
adopted... I am not qualified to decide between those views nor is it an 
appropriate exercise for a judge to undertake on judicial review. No doubt if 
it were clear that one view was tainted by irrationality in the Wednesbury 
sense, the court could so declare. But that is most unlikely to be established 
and, as it seems to me, we are here at the very fringe of what should properly 
be the subject of judicial review.50 
Embedded in this passage is a clear understanding of the role of the judiciary in the 
scrutiny of environmental modelling processes. According to this understanding, modelling 
falls squarely within the relative expertise of the executive and, accordingly, the judiciary’s 
role in scrutinising such models should be very light touch. The proper approach for a court, 
then, is to intervene only when the executive’s approach to modelling contains an error, which 
renders it unreasonable in the strict Wednesbury sense.51  
                                                          
48 Air Quality Directive (n  X), Article 23.   
49 Downs v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2008] EWHC 2666 (Admin), [2009] Env 
LR 19. Note that the High Court ultimately found for the applicant, a decision which was subsequently 
overturned by the Court of Appeal in [2009] EWCA Civ 664, [2009] 3 CMLR 46.  
50 ibid [38].  
51 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA), 230. 
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This way of thinking about the role of the judiciary in the scrutiny of environmental 
models, characterised as it is by a high level of deference, is not confined to the Downs case. 
In fact, Elizabeth Fisher, Wendy Wagner and Pasky Pascual52 have noted that there is a general 
tendency on the part of judges in similar cases to ‘stress their lack of competence and the 
importance of deference to expert discretion.’53 This is a tendency, the authors suggest, which 
is connected to a prevalent perception of such models as being inherently ‘scientific’54 and 
consisting of ‘a “thick of formulae and computer codes” that require specialist knowledge to 
navigate’.55 As a result, it is thought to being ‘too much part of what occurs in the back office 
of administrative practice’56 to be a subject of meaningful engagement by lawyers. 
Against this background, two points are particularly striking about Garnham J’s 
judgment in ClientEarth (No. 2). First, the high level of confidence with which the judge sets 
about scrutinising the Government’s environmental modelling approach and second, the 
relatively low level of error at which the judge intervenes. Thus, Garnham J’s judgment 
contains none of the customary references to the importance of deference, which Fisher et al 
suggest are traditionally characteristic of judicial decisions in this area. Relatedly, the ‘errors’ 
which Garnham J identifies in the Government’s modelling approach probably fall short of 
being ‘so unreasonable that no reasonable authority’57 would make them. This seems 
particularly true of the government’s use of the diesel vehicle emission estimates, which, the 
government argued, were ‘industry recognised standards’58 ‘used by most Member States 
across the EU.’59 
Does ClientEarth (No. 2) then mark some kind of transformation of the judicial approach 
to the scrutiny of environmental modelling? Might we expect to see this rigorousness of 
scrutiny reflected in all further cases? My view is that it does not. It is important, in particular, 
to bear in mind the particular legislative and regulatory backdrop to ClientEarth (No. 2). The 
case is set against both a legal obligation to reduce nitrogen dioxide levels of which the 
Government is in continuing breach and a clear quasi-remedial obligation on the part of the 
Government to take steps to ensure that the exceedance period is kept ‘as short as possible.’60 
The most likely explanation of Garnham J’s rigorous approach to scrutiny in ClienthEarth (No. 
2) is not that we are seeing a sea-change whereby the judiciary now feel more comfortable 
occupying a scrutiny role. It is rather that the relevant legal obligations engaged in the case 
were thought to necessitate a rigorous testing of whether the government’s response 
demonstrated a serious commitment to meeting these targets.  
This same point can be expressed in two different ways. One the one hand, and viewed 
narrowly, the interest of ClientEarth (No. 2) lies not in what it shows about the judiciary’s 
general approach to the scrutiny of models but in what it shows about the judiciary’s specific 
                                                          
52 Elizabeth Fisher, Pasky Pascual & Wendy Wagner, ‘Understanding Environmental Models in their Legal and 
Regulatory Context’ (2010) 22(2) JEL 251. 
53 ibid [259].  
54 ibid [263]. 
55 ibid, [263-264] citing Jerry Ravetz, ‘Models as Metaphors’ in Bernd Kasemir & Others (eds), Public 
Participation in Sustainability Science: A Handbook (CUP 2003), 70.  
56 ibid [264]. 
57 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA), 229.  
58 ClientEarth (No 2) (n 1), [78].  
59 ibid.  
60 Article 23, Air Quality Directive (n 2). 
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approach to scrutiny under Article 23 of the Air Quality Directive. Imagine, for instance, that 
the Government makes a voluntary commitment to reducing the quantity of nitrogen dioxide 
to a level considerably lower than that stipulated in the Air Quality Directive. An applicant 
initiates judicial review proceedings arguing that the Government’s use of a particular set of 
estimates in the production of an environmental model was unreasonable. Might we expect the 
reviewing court to exercise the same rigour in scrutinising the Government’s choice of 
estimates as Garnham J did in ClientEarth (No. 2)? It seems clear that we ought not; in all 
likelihood, a court would regard a reasonableness challenge as demanding a much less rigorous 
approach to scrutiny than one grounded substantially in the allegation that the government had 
failed to fulfil a clear obligation under EU law.  
On the other hand, and putting this same point more broadly, we might say the following: 
if there was ever a concern that the phrase ‘environmental modelling’ was thought of by judges 
as an automatic trigger for a highly deferential approach to scrutiny ClientEarth (No. 2) may 
go some way to alleviating those concerns. There are arguably certain phrases, which have 
operated in this way in UK law. Questions of ‘national security,’ for instance, have been said 
to require the accordance of ‘great weight’61 to the government’s judgment62 and it has been 
said that decisions about ‘public expenditure’ ought to be reviewed only against a ‘manifest 
absurdity’ standard.63 What ClientEarth (No. 2) tends to suggest, however, is that, when it 
comes to matters of environmental modelling, the judiciary takes a much more context-
sensitive approach, paying close attention, in particular, to the relevant legislative and 
regulatory scheme and allowing this scheme to shape its approach to scrutiny.   
 
THE DOMESTIC JUDICIAL REVIEW DIMENSION: ‘GROUNDS’ AS A LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANISING LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
In relation to the domestic judicial review dimension, it is important to reflect on the role that 
the two grounds of review – the error of law and irrelevant considerations –played in the 
applicant’s argument and the court’s reasoning in the case. It is my suggestion that doing so 
offers two important insights. First, that grounds of judicial review play a number of different 
roles in legal reasoning. Second, grounds of review may provide a useful legal structure around 
which difficult arguments of environmental law can be draped.  
My view is that the two grounds of review – error of law and irrelevant considerations – 
can be seen to have played a particular role in counsels’ argument and the court’s reasoning in 
ClientEarth (No. 2). These grounds, in particular, provided a legal framework around which 
the applicant’s arguments and the court’s judgment were organised. What I mean by this is the 
following. The applicant’s argument, and the court’s judgment, was grounded in the 
Government’s alleged breach of the ‘as short as possible’ requirement of the Article 23 of the 
Air Quality Directive. The role played by the concepts of error of law and irrelevant 
considerations was that of providing a legal structure around which these arguments and 
conclusions could be arranged and presented in a clearly recognisable legal form. Thus the 
conclusion that the government had ‘erred in law in [its] approach’64 to Article 23 was simply 
                                                          
61 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68 (HL), [29]. 
62 See also for example Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (HL).  
63 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Hammersmith & Fulham LBC [1991] 1 AC 521, 597. 
64 ClientEarth (No 2) (n 1), [38] (my emphasis).  
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a way of framing the court’s conclusion that the Government had failed to comply with the 
legal requirements therein. Similarly, the applicant’s argument that the Government had acted 
on irrelevant considerations of cost and administrative convenience was another way of 
framing the argument that the government had failed to fulfil its legal duty to identify the 
measures which would ensure that the exceedance period is kept ‘as short as possible.’ 
This is significant in two ways. First and from an administrative law perspective it raises 
the important question of whether this is the role played by grounds of review in all cases? 
Clearly, this is not the case. In particular, there seem to be at least two further, more substantive, 
roles grounds of review can play legal reasoning. First, a ground of review may function as a 
freestanding source of unlawfulness. That is, as a legal standard to which an applicant may 
point in order to make the argument that a public authority had acted unlawfully. The doctrine 
of legitimate expectations may be thought of as a ground of judicial review which functions in 
this way.65 Thus, it might be said of this doctrine, that it serves as a freestanding source of 
unlawfulness to which applicants may point to in order to argue that a failure to deliver the 
content of an assurance is unlawful.66 Second, it seems possible that certain grounds of review 
may function as principles of statutory construction. According to this understanding, the role 
played by a ground is that of providing substantive interpretive guidance to a judge by offering 
instruction as to how to resolve an ambiguity in legislation, which is, in some sense, silent on 
an issue. Take, for instance, the so-called ‘principle of legality.’67 A conventional 
understanding of this principle sees it as providing interpretive guidance to judges by 
instructing them to adopt a particular reading when legislation is capable both of being read in 
ways, which are compatible and incompatible with fundamental rights.  
As a result, from an administrative law perspective, ClientEarth (No. 2) is not an 
illustration of the function played by domestic grounds of judicial review, centrally because 
there is simply no such thing. It is, rather, a reminder that judicial review is both complex and 
varied. What the preceding analysis shows is that the concept of a ‘ground’ of review is not 
monistic; ‘grounds’ may be of different natures, they may play different roles in legal reasoning 
and they may interact with legislative and regulatory schemes in different ways. ClientEarth 
(No 2) is a nice illustration of one of the possible roles a ground may play: the provision of a 
legal framework for organising arguments based on the terms of a legislative or regulatory 
scheme, but this is far from the only role. 
It is also important to look at the role played by the error of law and irrelevant 
considerations ground in ClientEarth (No 2) from an environmental law perspective. The case 
is a useful illustration of the utility of these legal mechanisms in providing a recognisable legal 
structure around which difficult and novel arguments of environmental law can be arranged. 
Take, for instance, ClientEarth’s argument that the Government had acted unlawfully in 
continuing to generate predictions on a five-yearly cycle. In a sense, this was a difficult and 
legal novel argument to advance in that there was no obvious case law to which ClientEarth 
could point demonstrating the appropriateness of judicial intervention on such matters. The 
                                                          
65 See generally Joanna Bell, ‘The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations: Right-Conferring or Power-Constraining 
Legal Standard?’ [2016] PL 437.  
66 See for example R v North & East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213 (CA); Paponette 
v Attorney General of Trinidad & Tobago [2010] UKPC 32, [2012] 1 AC 1.  
67 See especially R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [1999] 3 WLR 328 (HL), 131-
132.  
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concept of irrelevant considerations, however, provided a recognisable legal structure over 
which that argument could be draped. This ground, in turn, seems to have played an important 
role in conceptually legitimising judicial intervention; it supplied a well-settled basis to which 
the judge could point as the legal foundation of his decision. One sense in which ClientEarth 
(No. 2) is important, then, is in illustrating the potential utility of the domestic grounds of 
judicial review in supplying established legal frameworks around which difficult and novel 
arguments of environmental law can be marshalled.  
 
CONCLUSION 
By way of conclusion, my argument is that there are three main ways in which ClientEarth 
(No. 2) is an important case worthy of close analysis. First, the case is interesting to those 
concerned about the Government’s continuing breach of its obligations under the Air Quality 
Directive. The outcome of the case is that the Government has been placed under an obligation 
to produce a new Air Quality Plan by April 2017.68 In the course of producing this plan, the 
Government will be required to adjust its air quality modelling approach, to select a date earlier 
than 2020 for the fulfilment of its obligations to reduce levels of nitrogen dioxide and to make 
use of less optimistic estimates of diesel-vehicle-emissions. It should be further noted that, as 
of 15 February 2017, the Government has been issued by a final warning from the European 
Commission requiring it to take steps in relation to its continuing breach of Article 13 within 
two months or else face further proceedings before the Court of Justice of the EU.69 
Second, ClientEarth (No. 2) calls attention to broader questions concerning the role the 
judiciary plays or will play in scrutinising approaches to environmental modelling. Here, I have 
suggested that, while ClientEarth (No. 2) does not mark a sea-change towards a generalised 
approach of rigorous scrutiny, it demonstrates the willingness of the judiciary to intensify 
scrutiny when the legislative and regulatory approach requires it. Third, and finally, the case is 
an important illustration of the role that certain grounds of review  – here error of law and 
irrelevancy – may play in providing a legal framework for around which legal argument can 
be organised. This is important in two respects. First, it is a reminder that the concept of a 
‘ground’ of review is not monistic. Second, it is a useful illustration of the significant role such 
grounds may play in providing a recognisable legal structure over which difficult and novel 
arguments of environmental law may be draped.  
                                                          
68 ClientEarth (n 4).  
69 Press release available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-238_en.htm (last accessed 29th March 
2017).  
